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CONSCIENCE AND AGENT-INTEGRITY: A DEFENCE OF CONSCIENCE-BASED 
EXEMPTIONS IN THE HEALTH CARE CONTEXT 
 
Mary Neal* and Sara Fovargue** 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The issue of conscientious refusal by health care practitioners continues to attract attention 
from academics, and was the subject of a recent UK Supreme Court decision. Activism aimed 
at changing abortion law and the decision to devolve governance of abortion law to the 
Scottish Parliament both raise the prospect of altered provision for conscience in domestic 
law. In this article, building on earlier work, we argue that conscience is fundamentally 
connected to moral integrity and essential to the proper functioning of moral agency. We 
examine recent attempts to undermine the view of conscience as a matter of integrity and 
argue that these have been unsuccessful. With our view of conscience as a prerequisite for 
moral integrity and agency established and defended, we then take issue with the 
µLQFRPSDWLELOLW\ WKHVLV¶ WKH FODLP WKDW SURWHFWLRQ IRU FRQVFLHQFH LV LQFRPSDtible with the 
professional obligations of healthcare practitioners). We reject each of the alternative 
premises on which the incompatibility thesis might rest, and challenge the assumption of a 
public/private divide which is entailed by all versions of the thesis. Finally, we raise concerns 
about the apparent blindness of the thesis to issues of power and privilege, and conclude that 
conscience merits robust protection.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The question of whether and to what extent conscientious refusals by health care 
professionals (HCPs) should be permitted is the focus of ongoing academic interest.1 
Conscience is also very much a live issue beyond the academy: the conscience provision in 
section 4(1) of the Abortion Act 1967 was recently interpreted narrowly by the Supreme 
Court in the case of Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan;2 a current campaign to 
decriminalise abortion completely3 raises questions about whether (and how) conscience 
would continue to be protected were the existing legislative apparatus to be swept away;4 and 
the decision to devolve governance of abortion law to the Scottish Parliament raises the 
prospect of new domestic law on abortion north of the border, including new (or even no) 
protection for conscience.5 
 Against this background, we set out here to defend the place of conscience-based 
exemptions (CBEs) in health care. In Section II we cRQVLGHU ZKDW µFRQVFLHQFH¶PHDQV DQG
why it is important, and endorse a version of the µPDLQVWUHDP¶ RU µGRPLQDQW¶ view that 
                                                          
1
 See, for e.g., the recent special issues of the Medical Law Review (volume 23(2) in 2015) and Bioethics 
(volume 28(1) in 2014) devoted to the issue. 
2
 [2014] UKSC 68. 
3
 6HH IRU HJ & 0XUSK\ µ:K\ LW LV WLPH WR GHFULPLQDOLVH DERUWLRQ¶ 12 February 2016, Progress website, 
www.progressonline.org.uk/2016/02/12/why-it-is-time-to-decriminalise-abortion/ accessed 23 April 2016; 
British Pregnancy Advisory Service (bpas), µ10 reasons to decriminalise abortion¶ ESDV ZHEVLWH
www.bpas.org/get-involved/advocacy/briefings/10-reasons -to-decriminalise-abortion/ accessed 23 April 2016. 
4
 In the view of Sally Sheldon, a prominent academic proponent of decriminalisation, ³LWZRXOGEHDSSURpriate 
to maintain a right of conscientious objection for healthcare professionals who choose to opt out of participating 
LQ DERUWLRQ SURFHGXUHV¶ S Sheldon µ7KH 'HFULPLQDOLVDWLRQ RI $ERUWLRQ $Q $UJXPHQW IRU 0RGHUQLVDWLRQ¶
(2015) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies published online 29 September 2015. It is unclear where such a right 
would be enshrined, since the 1967 Act (s4(1) of which currently provides the right of conscientious refusal in 
relation to abortion) would presumably be repealed as part of the decriminalisation process. 
5
 Scotland Act 2016, s53. 
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conscience is a matter of personal integrity. Specifically, we associate conscience with the 
possibility of moral agency, arguing that what is safeguarded when we protect conscience is 
µDJHQW-LQWHJULW\¶WKHLQWHJULW\RIWKHindividual qua moral agent. In Section III we defend the 
integrity view of conscience against recent attempts to problematise it. In Section IV, having 
set out and GHIHQGHG RXU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI FRQVFLHQFH ZH DGGUHVV WKH µLncompatibility 
thesis¶6 i.e. the claim that allowing HCPs to refuse to participate in certain practices on 
grounds of conscience is incompatible with their professional obligations. We argue that the 
incompatibility thesis is grounded either in claims of value-neutrality or of DQ µLQWHUQDO
PRUDOLW\RIPHGLFLQH¶DQGZHUHMHFWHDFKRIWKHVHFODLPV in turn. Throughout, our argument 
is animated by the understanding that failure to protect conscience poses an unacceptable 
threat to the moral agency of affected HCPs, so that we see a strong positive case for 
protecting conscience over and above the negative argument that the incompatibility thesis is 
not made out. 
 Our focus throughout is on CBEs²the facility to opt out of performing certain 
actions on grounds of conscience. We appreciate that conscience can also be discussed in 
terms of perceived moral obligations to act µFRQVFLHQWLRXVFRPPLWPHQW¶), but we regard this 
as raising different issues, and therefore as being beyond the scope of our discussion here. 
 
II. CONSCIENCE AS A MATTER OF AGENT-INTEGRITY 
 
Daniel Sulmasy has expressed surprise that µLQDOOWKHUHFHQWGHEDWHVDERXWFRQVFLHQFH « so 
little attention has been paid to understanding what conscience is and what its importance 
might be¶.7 Those who do address the meaning of conscience tend to treat it as a matter of 
                                                          
6
 05:LFFODLUµ,VFRQVFLHQWLRXVREMHFWLRQLQFRPSDWLEOHZLWKDSK\VLFLDQ¶VSURIHVVLRQDOREOLJDWLRQV"¶
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 171, 172. 
7
 '6XOPDV\µ:KDWLVFRQVFLHQFHDQGZK\LVUHVSHFWIRULWVRLPSRUWDQW"¶Theoretical Medicine and 
Bioethics 135, 135. 
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integrity, either by making a direct link between the concepts of conscience and integrity 
(often UHIHUUHG WR HLWKHU DV µPRUDO LQWHJULW\¶ RU µSHUVRQDO LnWHJULW\¶ RU E\ PDNLQJ the link 
more obliquely, via a discussion of moral agency. In the former category, Mark Wicclair 
canvasses various alternative explanations for why conscience deserves protection (including 
ethical relativism, toleration of diversity, respect for autonomy and respect for moral 
integrity) and FRQFOXGHV WKDW µWKH PRVW SURPLVLQJ >H[SODQDWLRQ@ LV UHVSHFW IRU PRUDO
LQWHJULW\¶8 so that µDSSHDOVWRFRQVFLHQFHFDQEHXQGHUVWRRGDVHIIRUWVWRSUHVHUYHRUPDLQWDLQ
moral iQWHJULW\¶.9 Likewise, Armand $QWRPPDULDDJUHHVWKDWµ>F@ODLPVRIFRQVFLHQFHVKRXOG
fundamentally be understood as claims to maintain personal integULW\¶ and that the 
importance of CBEs derives from the significance of the value of integrity which underpins 
them.10 
 While some simply assert the connection between conscience and integrity, others 
reflect on the nature of the link. Dan Brock, for example, explains that:  
 
Deeply held and important moral judgments of conscience constitute the central bases 
of inGLYLGXDOV¶ PRUDO LQWHJULW\ WKH\ GHILQH ZKR DW OHDVW PRUDOO\ VSHDNLQJ WKH
individual is, what she stands for, what is the central moral core of her character.  
Maintaining her moral integrity then requires that she not violate her moral 
commitments and gives others reason to respect her doing so, not because those 
commitments must be true or justified, but because the maintenance of moral integrity 
LVDQLPSRUWDQWYDOXHFHQWUDOWRRQH¶VVWDWXVDVDPRUDOSHUVRQ.11 
 
                                                          
8
 05:LFFODLUµ&RQVFLHQWLRXVREMHFWLRQLQPHGLFLQH¶Bioethics 205, 205. 
9
 Ibid, 213. 
10
 $+0 $QWRPPDULD µ&RQVFLHQWLRXV REMHFWLRQ LQ FOLQLFDO SUDFWLFH 1RWLFH LQIRrmed consent, referral, and 
HPHUJHQF\WUHDWPHQW¶Ave Maria Law Review 81, 82.  Also, 91. 
11
 ':%URFNµ&RQVFLHQWLRXVUHIXVDOE\SK\VLFLDQVDQGSKDUPDFLVWV:KRLVREOLJDWHGWRGRZKDWDQGZK\"¶
(2008) 29 Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 187, 189, emphasis added. 
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In 6XOPDV\¶V YLHZ FRQVFLHQFH µDULVHV IUom a fundamental commitment or intention to be 
PRUDO ,W XQL¿HV WKH FRJQLWLYH FRQDWLYH DQG HPRWLRQDO DVSHFWV RI WKH PRUDO OLIH E\ D
FRPPLWPHQW WR LQWHJULW\ RU PRUDO ZKROHQHVV¶12 Similarly, Kent Greenawalt observes that 
someone who conscientiously refuses WRSDUWLFLSDWHLQDSDUWLFXODUSUDFWLFHµZRXOGGLVUHJDUGD
GHHS DVSHFW RI KHU LGHQWLW\ LI VKH ZHQW DORQJ¶13 %URFN¶V 6XOPDV\¶V DQG *UHHQDZDOW¶V
accounts all clearly connect conscience, integrity and identity, and suggest that protection for 
conscience promotes personal integrity precisely by enabling individuals to develop and 
maintain their identities as moral agents. 
 The connection between conscience and moral agency is made even more explicit by 
Daniel Weinstock who QRWHV WKDW D SHUVRQ¶V µVHQVH RI ZKR she is as a person is partly 
FRQVWLWXWHGE\WKHRQJRLQJDFWLYLW\RIWKLQNLQJIRUKHUVHOIDERXWPRUDOLVVXHV¶, VRWKDWµZKHQ
ZHUHFRJQL]HDKHDOWKFDUHSURIHVVLRQDO¶VULJKWWR>FRQVFLHQWLRXVO\@UHIXVHZH « respect the 
moral agency of those who hold reasonabOHGLVVHQWLQJYLHZV¶14 CRQYHUVHO\µDVWDWHWKDWGLG
not protect conscience, and that did not allow the individual to act according to the 
conclusions of her moral reasoning would fail to display appropriate respect for her as a 
moral agent¶.15 Farr Curlin and colleagues also UHIOHFWWKDWµDFWLQJFRQVFLHQWLRXVO\LVWKHKHDUW
of the ethical life, and to the extent that physicians give it up, they are no longer acting as 
moral agents¶.16   
 However, some of those who emphasise agency when discussing conscience seem to 
be conflating rather than connecting those concepts. For example, John Hardt defines 
                                                          
12
 Sulmasy, n 7 above, 138. 
13
 K *UHHQDZDOWµ5HIXVDOVRIFRQVFLHQFH:KDWDUHWKH\DQGZKHQVKRXOGWKH\EHDFFRPPRGDWHG¶Ave 
Maria Law Review 47, 49. 
14
 ':HLQVWRFN µ&RQVFLHQWLRXVUHIXVDODQGKHDOWKSURIHVVLRQDOV'RHVUHOLJLRQPDNHDGLIIHUHQFH"¶ 
Bioethics 8, 11-12. 
15
 Ibid, 9, emphasis added. 
16
 )$&XUOLQ5(/DZUHQFHDQG-'/DQWRVµ7KHDXWKRUVUHSO\¶New England Journal of Medicine 
1889, 1891. 
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conscience as µPDNLQJ PRUDO MXGJPHQWV DERXW D SUDFWLFDO FRXUVH RI DFWLRQ¶,17 or, citing 
Aquinas, DV µthe making of reasonable decisions in light of moral norms, practical 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQV DQG FRQWH[WXDO IDFWV¶18  Yet the concepts are not coterminous, as a brief 
consideration of the philosophical literature on conscience clarifies. 
 Allen Wood suggests WKDWµSKLORVRSKLFDOWKHRULHVRIFRQVFLHQFHPLJKWEHFDWHJRUL]HG
under three headings: moral knowledge theories, motivation theories, and reflection 
WKHRULHV¶19  Moral knowledge theory treats conscience as a source of moral knowledge, as 
something we consult for information about what is right and wrong.20 Examples include the 
LPDJHRIFRQVFLHQFHDVµDODZZULWWHQE\*RG>LQPHQ¶VKHDUWV@¶,21 or John Henry 1HZPDQ¶V
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIFRQVFLHQFHDVµdivine law « DSSUHKHQGHGLQWKHPLQGVRILQGLYLGXDOPHQ¶, 
where conscience is understood as something innate, bestowed upon the human individual 
before she becomes rational, enabling KHUWRKHDUWKHµYRLFHRI*RG¶DVGLVWLQFWIURPKHURZQ
wills and desires.22 A moral knowledge XQGHUVWDQGLQJPLJKW OHDGVRPHRQH WR VD\ WKDW µP\
conscience tells me x¶ RU WR VSHDN RI µFRQVXOWLQJ¶ KHU FRQVFience. By contrast, motivation 
theories treat conscience as a stimulus for behaviour. This is the kind of view signalled by 
UHIHUHQFHV WR WKH µXUJLQJ¶ µSURPSWLQJ¶ RU µSURGGLQJ¶ RI FRQVFLHQFH and is reflected in 
&KULVWRSKHU+LWFKHQV¶PHPRUDEOHDQGVFHSWLFDOGHVFULSWLRQRIFRQVFLHQFHDVµZKDWHYHULWLV
WKDW PDNHV XV EHKDYH ZHOO ZKHQ QRERG\ LV ORRNLQJ¶23 Finally, in reflection theories the 
exercise of conscience is taken to involve reflecting upon, and making judgements about, 
moral matters.  
 
                                                          
17
 --+DUGWµ7KHFRQVFLHQFHGHEDWHUHVRXUFHVIRUUDSSURFKHPHQWIURPWKHSUREOHP¶VSHUFHLYHGVRXUFH¶
29 Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 151, 154. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 A Wood, Kantian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 182, emphasis in original. 
20
 2QHZD\RIWUDQVODWLQJWKH/DWLQURRWµFRQVFLHQWLD¶LVµZLWKNQRZOHGJH¶ 
21
 Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes, Promulgated by His Holiness, 
Pope Paul VI on December 7 1965, para 16. 
22
 -+ &DUGLQDO 1HZPDQ µ/HWWHU WR WKH 'XNH RI 1RUIRON ¶ LQ Certain Difficulties felt by Anglicans in 
Catholic Teaching Vol. II (London: Longmans Green, 1900), 247. 
23
 C Hitchens, God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (London: Atlantic Books, 2007) 256. 
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 The various categories are not mutually exclusive, so a particular account might 
acknowledge, for example, both the importance of moral reflection and the capacity of 
conscience to function as a spur to action. St Thomas Aquinas, for example, understood 
conscience as practical reason; the capacity to use reason to derive moral principles and apply 
them in particular situations24  Likewise, although Joseph Butler emphasised the motivational 
element when he described FRQVFLHQFHDVDµQDWXUDOJXLGH¶ that we have a duty to follow,25 
for Butler this process was reflective and not intuitive - necessarily involving the ability to 
use reason in moral decision-making. In Immanuel .DQW¶Vethical theory, having a conscience 
amounts to having the fundamental capacity for carrying out moral reflection, and our duty is 
WRHQJDJHLQWKLVUHIOHFWLRQDQGWKHQWRµDWWHQGWRWKHYHUGLFWRIRXUFRQVFLHQFH¶ (thus it could 
be said that Kant's approach combines elements of reflection and motivation).26 
 7KH ZRUG µYHUGLFW¶ LQ .DQW¶V DFFRXQW hints at the legalism that characterises his 
approach to conscience. As Wood observes, Kant understood FRQVFLHQFHDVµDQLQQHUFRXUWRI
PRUDOMXGJPHQW¶27 so that when we exercise conscience ZHµSODFHRXUVHOYHVEHIRUHWKHLQQHU
MXGJHDQGKHHGWKHYHUGLFW¶28 As Wood also SRLQWVRXW.DQW¶VFKRLFHRIWKHOHJDOPHWDSKRU
serves to emphasise the rational and objective nature of conscience as he (Kant) understands 
it.29 The exercise of conscience is envisaged here as a complex internal role-play involving 
various personae, all performed by the same human protagonist. Although the forum is 
LQWHUQDOµWKHPRUDOODZWKDWDOOWKHLQQHUSDUWLHVUHFRJQL]H>LV@RQHWKDWKDVEHHQOHJLVODWHGE\
the idea of the will of every rational being, and in that sense, the rational standards used in the 
inner court are the same as would apply in a public forum¶.30 Thus, the arguments and 
                                                          
24
 The Summa Theologiae of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Latin-English edition, Volume II, Prima Pars, Q. 65-119 
(NovAntiqua, Michigan, 2009) I, q. 79, a. 13, co. (emphasis added).  
25
 J Butler (1726), WR Matthews (intro), Butler's Fifteen Sermons & A Dissertation on the Nature of Vice 
(London: Bell and Sons, 1964) 6. 
26
 Wood, n 19 above, 187. 
27
 Ibid, 185. 
28
 Ibid, 187. 
29
 Ibid, 185. 
30
 Ibid, 186. 
8 
 
reasons used in arriving at judgements of conscience must be reasoned, must appeal to 
objective or universal standards DQGFDQQRWEHµPHUHO\DUHVSRQVHWRLQFKoate, prerational « 
feelings¶.31  
 µ0RUDODJHQF\¶FDQUHIHUERWKWRDQDFWLYLW\DFWLQJLQUHODWLRQWRULJKt and wrong) and 
to a property.  An individual is a moral agent if she has the capacity to act morally (whether 
or not she is presently exercising that capacity); in other words, if she can be held morally 
responsible for her actions.32 Here, we suggest that moral agency entails the capacity to do all 
of the following:  
 
(i) identify the sources of moral authority (values, standards, principles and so on) 
which the moral agent recognises as valid and to which she ought, therefore, to 
have regard;33  
(ii) reflect on what these moral standards require of the agent, either in terms of a 
general, ongoing commitment, or in terms of what is right and wrong in 
relation to a particular set of circumstances; 
(iii) recognise that the demands of morality provide the agent with a motivation to 
act; and 
(iv) act in accordance with the demands of morality. 
 
 Each of the philosophical theories of conscience identified by Wood identifies 
µconscience¶ with one of these elements of moral agency. For moral knowledge theorists, 
                                                          
31
 Ibid. Cf Hedley J in Re Wyatt [2005] EWHC 2293 (Fam) at [@µ&RQVFLHQFHZKHWKHURQHEHOLHYHVLWWREH
God-given or culturally conditioned) is not a wholly rational sense. It is more in the nature of intuition or hunch 
DVWRZKHWKHUVRPHWKLQJLVULJKWRUZURQJ¶ 
32
 In adopting this definition of moral agency, we do not make the quite distinct and more controversial claim 
that only moral agents are entitled to full or equal moral respect and consideration. The question of whether 
KXPDQEHLQJVZKRDUHQRWµDJHQWV¶LQWKLVVHQVHIRUH[DPSOH, infants and permanently unconscious patients) are 
full members of the moral community is a separate issue and not one which we are required to address here. 
33
 +HUHµKDYHUHJDUGWR¶PLJKWPHDQDQ\WKLQJIURPµRZHDEVROXWHREHGLHQFH¶WRµEHJXLGHGE\¶GHSHQGLQJRQ
the nature of WKHVWDQGDUGDQGWKHQDWXUHRIWKHDJHQW¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRLW 
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conscience involves apprehending, recognising and perhaps also ranking the various sources 
of authoritative information regarding what is right, wrong, required and prohibited, morally 
speaking. Thus, it corresponds to (i) above. Reflection theories seem to identify conscience 
with deliberation about moral matters and the application of moral standards to real life 
situations and contexts: i.e. with activity under (ii). Motivation theories map on to (iii), at 
least insofar as they emphasise motivation by reasons. Motivation theories of conscience 
which identify conscience with instinctive or emotional responses are possible, but unless 
they acknowledge some scope for the individual being motivated by moral reasons, it is 
difficult to see how they could have the kind of connection with moral agency we are 
discussing here. As already noted in relation to the examples of Aquinas, Butler, and Kant, 
many influential theories of conscience identify conscience with more than one element of 
moral agency. In our view, the link between conscience and moral agency is not only well-
established in mainstream discussion of conscience, but is clearly entailed by our 
understanding of what moral agency involves. 
 It follows from all of WKLV WKDW ZH FDQ FKDUDFWHULVH DV µLQWHJULW\-EDVHG DFFRXQWV¶ RI
conscience not only those which make explicit the link between the concepts of conscience 
and integrity, but also those which refer to the close relationship between conscience and 
µmoral agency¶ or µmoral identity¶. Hardt, for example, KDV QRWHG WKDW µconscience is a 
necessary component of the moral life in general and a necessary resource for maintaining a 
coherent sense of moral agency¶34 Identifying conscience as an essential element in the 
GHYHORSPHQW DQG PDLQWHQDQFH RI WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V LGHQWLW\ DV D PRUDO DJHQW LQ WKH IDFH RI
external pressure, entails acknowledgment of the relationship between conscience and 
integrity. 
 
                                                          
34
 Hardt, n 17 above, 151. 
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 Here, we have unpacked the familiar claim that conscience is a matter of integrity, 
arguing that the faculty of conscience is an essential element in the activity of moral agency 
and so is a prerequisite for the status or identity of being a moral agent. We use the term 
µDJHQW-integrit\¶to emphasise that what conscience enables/supports/promotes/protects is the 
integrity of moral agents qua moral agents - the integrity of the capacity for agency itself, as 
opposed to µLQWHJULW\¶ loosely conceived as moral consistency, inner harmony, loyalty to 
RQH¶VPRUDOFRPPLWPHQWVan absence of guilty feelings, or such like.35 We see protection for 
conscience as having at least two important functions in preserving agent-integrity. First, in a 
positive sense, conscience rights foster the development and maintenance of agent-integrity 
by delineating a protected zone wherein the individual is able to develop and practice her 
skills as a moral agent, and develop and maintain her identity as such. Second, in a negative 
sense, CBEs are a shield against violations such as forced complicity in perceived 
wrongdoing that would undermine the FRKHUHQFH RI DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V DJHQF\ GLVUXSWLQJ WKH
link between the stages of agency by severing the link between conscientious reflection and 
conscientious action. 
 
III. NO PERSUASIVE REFUTATION OF µINTEGRITY¶ VIEWS 
 
There has been surprisingly little attempt to critique integrity based views of conscience, 
although two recent interventions are noteworthy - $OEHUWR*LXELOLQL¶VDWWHPpt to refute the 
                                                          
35
 It has recently been argued WKDW ZKHQ µLQWHJULW\¶ LV XQGHUVWRRG LQ WKHVH µZHDN¶ ZD\V LW IDLOV WR SURYLGH
sufficient justification for protecting and respecting rights RIFRQVFLHQFH&&RZOH\µ$GHIHQFHRIFRQVFLHQWLRXV
REMHFWLRQLQPHGLFLQH$UHSO\WR6FKXNOHQNDQG6DYXOHVFX¶ Bioethics DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12233. What 
we propose here is a VWURQJHUµLQWHJULW\¶ view, which sees conscience as a sine qua non of moral agency.  
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integrity view,36 and CaroO\Q 0F/HRG¶V SURSRVDO IRU D µUHODWLRQDO IHPLQLVW YLHZ¶ RI
conscience,37 which has subsequently been adopted and developed by Chloë Fitzgerald.38  
 
A. Giubilini: a sceptical view of integrity/conscience 
 
Giubilini aims to VKRZWKDWµDUJXPHQWVLQGHIHQVHRIFRnscientious objection based on respect 
IRU«PRUDO LQWHJULW\ DUH H[WUHPHO\ ZHDN¶ DQG WKDW µWKH UROH RI PRUDO LQWHJULW\ DQG
conscientious objection in health care should be significantly downplayed and left out of the 
range of ethically relevant considerations¶.39 His argument consists of two main stages.  First: 
 
it is not possible to defend conscientious objection in healthcare by simply appealing 
to the value of respect for moral integrity, because it is not possible to constrain such 
respect to prevent undesirable (and unacceptable) consequences.40  
 
This is where we might expect to encounter the argument denying that conscience is a matter 
of integrity; however Giubilini makes no such case. Instead, for Giubilini, both conscience 
and µPRUDO LQWHJULW\¶ RXJKW to be avoided in decision-makinJ µLQ WKH KHDOWKFDUH FRQWH[W¶41 
EHFDXVHWKH\DUHµDQHPLFPRUDOFRQFHSWV¶which µ>GR@QRWDOORZXVWRmake any progress in 
PRUDO UHDVRQLQJ¶.42 Throughout, Giubilini bundles the concepts of conscience and moral 
integrity together, which has the effect of reinforcing, rather than destabilising, the notion that 
they are fundamentally connected. His thesis is that respect for conscience/integrity cannot be 
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limited in a satisfactory way, or, more accurately, cannot be limited to his satisfaction. 
Giubilini acknowledges that others have proposed limits to the scope and exercise of CBEs, 
often converging around the same or similar criteria, but complains that: 
 
any criteria proposed for limiting freedom of conscience fall short of providing a 
satisfactory account of why certain forms of conscientious objection - for instance to 
abortion - should be accepted and certain others - for instance to inspecting patients of 
the opposite sex - should not.43 
 
Even if Giubilini is correct that none of the criteria proposed so far succeed in this regard, this 
GRHV QRW PHDQ WKDW QR VDWLVIDFWRU\ ZD\ RI GLVWLQJXLVKLQJ EHWZHHQ µDFFHSWDEOH¶ DQG
µXQDFFHSWDEOH¶ FRQVFLHQFH FODLPV LV SRVVLEOH 7he literature is ever-expanding and new 
suggestions about how to delimit the scope of CBEs continue to emerge. For example, we 
have argued that it is possible to identify a number of logical and defensible restrictions on 
the scope of CBEs.44 Our first restricting factor is that the logical territorial extent of CBEs is 
thH SHULSKHU\ RI µSURSHU PHGLFDO WUHDWPHQW¶ ZKHUH WKH VWDWXV RI D SUDFWLFH DV µSURSHU¶ LV
liminal: 
 
$ WUHDWPHQWPD\RFFXS\ OLPLQDO VWDWXVEHFDXVH GHVSLWHEHLQJ ODZIXO LW LV µPRUDOO\
FRQWURYHUVLDODQGFRQWHQWLRXV¶ Practices which involve the ending of human life, such 
as abortion, IVF, and withholding or withdrawing treatment from unconscious 
SDWLHQWVRUVHYHUHO\GLVDEOHGQHZERUQVDUHOLPLQDOO\µSURSHU¶IRUWKLVUHDVRQDVVLVWHG
dying  will be too, if it becomes lawful to provide it within the healthcare context « 
[a] treatment may also have liminal status if it is extremely risky or experimental, or if 
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it is more concerned with the satisfaction of preferences than with healing or treating 
disease (as is arguably true of certain cosmetic procedures, and assisted reproduction 
for same sex couples and single people).45 
 
This is, of course, only one suggestion, but it illustrates that it is possible to make reasonable 
attempts to capture the difference between seeking CBEs from abortion, on the one hand, and 
examining patients of the opposite sex, on the other. Our suggestion is that the cases can be 
distinguished on the basis that whereas abortion is liminally proper medical treatment 
because it involves the ending of human life, treating patients of the opposite sex is not 
liminal under any of the categories of liminality we propose. 
 Even if our suggestion is rejected, this does not mean that no satisfactory criterion is 
possible, as Giubilini claims. He does not suggest that no criteria can be identified at all, only 
WKDW QRQH FDQ EH LGHQWLILHG ZKLFK GR QRW µSUHYHQW XQGHVLUDEOH DQG XQDFFHSWDEOH
FRQVHTXHQFHV¶46 One obvious riposte to this is that consequences are undesirable and/or 
unacceptable, not objectively, but from a particular point of view. Many may welcome, for 
example, a consequence such as the extension of CBEs to new areas of health care or to new 
categories of HCP, or the increased rarity of practices like abortion. If a set of criteria is 
prima facie defensible, the conclusion that its consequenFHV DUH µXQGHVLUDEOH DQG
XQDFFHSWDEOH¶ LV D VXEMHFWLYH MXGJement that presupposes precisely the sort of moral 
consensus that is missing and whose absence the CBE serves. 
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 ,Q WKH VHFRQG VWDJH RI KLV DUJXPHQW *LXELOLQL SURSRVHV DQ µDOWHUQDWLYH DQG PRUH
promLVLQJ DSSURDFK¶ WR WKH SUREOem he thinks he has identified - the lack of acceptable 
constraints on conscience.47 The question we ought to ask, he says, is: 
 
whether impartiality towards conflicting parties should refer to (1) the individuals 
involved in the conflict, in which case we should grant them equal rights and 
protections in the name of respect for moral integrity « or to (2) the different moral 
positions at stake, in which case we should base the acceptability of these positions on 
an unbiased and rational assessment of their plausibility.48 
 
Giubilini maintains that the majority of the literature on conscience in health care to date 
approaches the issue in the first way. Instead, he proposes adopting the second approach and 
claims that when we do so, LWEHFRPHVDSSDUHQWWKDWµRQO\E\GHIHQGLQJVRPHIRUPRIPRUDO
relativism or subjectivism is it possible to make a case for respecting health care 
SUDFWLWLRQHUV¶ PRUDO LQWHJULW\ DQG JUDQWLQJ WKHP D Uight to conscientious objection¶.49 In 
*LXELOLQL¶VYLHZ, however, relativist and subjectivist positions are untenable  for proponents 
of CBEs, because insofar as the latter make objectivist claims about the wrongness of 
particular practices (like abortion), they are committed to saying that their view is superior to 
opposing views, not that it is equally valid and deserving of equal respect.50 The essence of 
this second stage of his argument is that to defend CBEs is to concede relativism and promote 
moral compromise, and that this is clearly incompatible with holding that there is an 
REMHFWLYHµWUXWKRIWKHPDWWHU¶ 
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 This analysis can be challenged on a number of grounds)LUVWPXFKRI*LXELOLQL¶V
argument depends on the idea that CBEs represent a compromise.  He introduces them as 
such at the outset and continues to refer to them in this way throughout.51 But even if we are 
confident that, historically, a particular conscience provision is the result of political 
compromise, WKLV GRHV QRW PHDQ WKDW HDFK LQGLYLGXDO ZKR DYDLOV KHUVHOI RI WKH SURYLVLRQ¶V
protection is thereby engaging in moral compromise. We may wish to describe section 4(1) 
of the Abortion Act 1967, for example, as a historical (and perhaps ongoing) political 
compromise, but this is irrelevant at the level of individual ethics. A doctor who declares 
herself bound by conscience to refrain from participating in abortion is not thereby signalling 
her approval for the political compromise that may or may not be reflected in the statutory 
provision she relies on. Nor is she expressing respect for the views with which she disagrees. 
She is simply ensuring that she does not incur personal moral responsibility for action she 
believes to be gravely wrong. Giubilini acknowledges that CBEVDUHµRIWHQFODLPHGE\WKRVH
who believe that abortion is wrong « [and] that this is an objective truth, and not out of the 
belief that the pro-abortion and anti-abortion arguments are on equal footing¶.52  However, 
*LXELOLQL¶VSRVLWLRQLVWKDWCBEsDVµFRPSURPLVHV¶ are incompatible with objectivist views. 
He claims that someoQHZKRUHJDUGVDERUWLRQDVREMHFWLYHO\ZURQJLVREOLJHGWRFRPPLWµQRW
[to] the compromise represented by conscientious objection, but [to] civil disobedience aimed 
at changing an unjust and wrong law¶.53 
 This is mistaken, and not only because the exercise of a CBE is not (or not 
necessarily) a moral compromise at the individual level. Even if it is accepted that those 
committed to the view that abortion is objectively immoral are obliged not only to protect 
themselves from complicity in moral wrongdoing, but also to seek to eradicate the immoral 
practice as a whole (and Giubilini does not establish such an obligation), it is consistent for 
                                                          
51
 Ibid, at (eg) 160, 164, 175, 177, 179, 181. 
52
 Ibid, 179. 
53
 Ibid. 
16 
 
them to exercise CBEs in order to ensure their own non-complicity in moral wrongdoing 
while also engaging in efforts to change the law - efforts which need not amount to civil 
disobedience. %HLQJFRPPLWWHGWRµFKDQJLQJDQXQMXVWODZ¶ but might involve lobbying RQH¶V
MP when Parliament is due to vote on relevant issues, FRQVLGHULQJ SDUWLHV¶ SROLFLHV DQG
LQGLYLGXDO03V¶YRWLQJUHFRUGVRQµSUR-OLIH¶LVVXHVZKHQGHciding how to vote in elections, 
donating to organisations that work to change the law, DQGPDNLQJWKHµSUR-OLIH¶FDVHZKHQ
the opportunity arises in debate and discussion with friends and colleagues. Many lawful, 
democratic means for effecting change exist, and individual CBEs can surely be used in 
conjunction with these wider strategies. But it is problematic to suggest, as Giubilini does, 
WKDWWKHGRFWRUZLWKµSUR-OLIH¶YLHZVVKRXOGonly seek to change the law and should be willing 
to participate in abortions in the meantime. The OHDS WR µFLYLO GLVREHGLHQFH¶ VHHPV
unnecessary precisely because no-one is obliged by law to participate in abortion.  
 Thus, the supposed incompatibility between compromise and objectivism never arises 
for those actually exercising CBEs, since they are not engaging in compromise at all. As far 
as those defending CBEs are concerned (academics and policymakers, for example): taking 
abortion once again as the example, it is open to these people to argue that, whatever their 
personal views about the morality of abortion, they regard it as immoral to require another 
person to participate in a practice that she considers to be seriously wrong, and that it is this 
latter moral intuition that animates their defence of CBEs, rather than any objective position 
on the morality of abortion. Thus, the defence of CBEs need not embody compromise either 
(instead, it may express the positive moral position just described), and it certainly need not 
coexist with any objective view about the (im)morality of abortion. 
 Another problem with *LXELOLQL¶VDQDO\VLVLVWKDWKHVHHPVWRVXSSRVHWKDWWKHcentral 
question is one of µLPSDUWLDOLW\¶.54 The mainstream position, as we discussed in Section II, 
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however, is that protecting conscience is not about impartiality, but is, rather, the non-neutral 
enterprise of positively respecting the agent-integrity of others. Giubilini does not succeed in 
problematising this mainstream idea, so his assertion that CBEs are somehow about 
impartiality (either toward individuals or ideas) is not made out. Furthermore, his assumption 
WKDW FRQVFLHQFH EHORQJV LQ WKH µSULYDWH VSKHUH WKDW UHTXLUHV HDFK LQGLYLGXDO WR SURYLGH
MXVWLILFDWLRQV RQO\ WR KHUVHOI QRW WR DQ\RQH HOVH¶55 is questionable, because although 
legitimate concerns about subjectivity do arise in relation to conscience rights, conscience 
clearly has both private and public dimensions. RHFDOO.DQW¶VYLHZRIFRQVFLHQFH in which, 
although much deliberation does take place internally, the standards applied are collectively 
determined and publicly DFFHVVLEOH 6RPH KDYH GHVFULEHG FRQVFLHQFH DV D µUHODWLRQDO¶
SKHQRPHQRQLQVRIDUDVµZHPD\UHTXLUHWKHKHOSRIRWKHUVWREHFRPHDZDUHRIRXULPSOLFLW
attitudes and thus to be able to regulate them¶.56 Additionally, the exercise of conscience is 
usually public and many commentators propose requiring those exercising CBEs to make 
good faith attempts to articulate their positions (and the reasoning that has gone into arriving 
at them) in a forum that is, to some extent, public.57 Elsewhere, we have described a 
willingness to do this not only as one of the duties of a HCP seeking to exercise a CBE but as 
one of the criteria for genuine conscientiousness.58 Thus, conscience naturally straddles both 
the public and private spheres, and the public dimension can be enhanced by making the 
exercise of CBEs conditional on the fulfilment of publicity or articulation requirements.   
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 $OVRSUREOHPDWLFLV*LXELOLQL¶VSURSRVDOWKDWZHVKRXOGconcentrate on the rationality 
of the ethical positions at stake, rather than on the integrity of the agents who hold them. The 
emphasis should not be on respecting, tolerating, or protecting human beings, he says, but on 
µDQXQELDVHGDQGUDWLRQDODVVHVVPHQW¶RIWKHSODXVLELOLW\RIWKe various competing positions.59 
An obvious response to this is to point out that 'plausibility' is, quite simply, far too subjective 
to be allowed to be the test for the permissibility of CBEs. Whether I regard a proposition as 
'plausible' or not will depend not only on its objective merits, but also on my background, my 
prejudices, and my inclinations. Moreover, to focus on positions in the abstract, rather than 
on people, is to ignore ethically relevant factors like emotion, vulnerability and harm. A 
supporter of the mainstream position might well point out that the harm of failing to respect 
integrity is harm to people and not to positions. 
 Giubilini is mistaken, therefore, in his claim that no credible basis for distinguishing 
between valid and invalid exercises of conscience is possible, and also in failing to recognise 
that the judgePHQW WKDWFRQVHTXHQFHVDUH µXQGHVLUDEOHRUXQDFFHSWDEOH¶ LVD VXEMHFWLYHRQH
His claim that the exercise of a CBE reflects a compromise is problematic too, as is his 
insistence that respect for conscience is (or ought to be) motivated by impartiality. For 
present purposes, however, the most important thing to note about *LXELOLQL¶VDFFRXQW is its 
failure to dissociate conscience from integrity. Insofar as he believes he has problematized 
the role of integrity, Giubilini believes he has also problematised conscience. As such, his 
FULWLTXH LV UHDOO\ DQRWKHU LWHUDWLRQ RI WKH µLQFRPSDWLELOLW\ WKHVLV¶ WKH YLHZ WKDW CBEs are 
incompatible with HCPV¶ SURIHVVLRQDO REOLJDWLRQV GLVFXssed more fully in Section IV) 
already familiar from the work of Julian Savulescu,60 Ian Kennedy,61 Julie Cantor62 and 
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others.63 &ULWLFDOO\*LXELOLQL¶VUHMHFWLRQRIintegrity and conscience seems to reinforce, rather 
than undermine, the idea of an association between them. Indeed, in a later piece, he 
GHVFULEHV WKH YLHZ µWKDW RXU FRQVFLHQFH LV HVVHQWLDO WR RXU PRUDO LQWHJULW\¶ DV
µXQFRQWURYHUVLDO¶64 
 
B. McLeod and Fitzgerald: A µIHPLQLVWUHODWLRQDOYLHZ¶RIFRQVFLHQFH 
 
McLeod is concerned to challenge what VKH FDOOV WKH µGRPLQDQW YLHZ RI FRQVFLHQFH¶
DFFRUGLQJ WR ZKLFK FRQVFLHQFH SURPRWHV µLQWHJULW\¶ FRQFHLYHG DV µLQQHU RU SV\FKRORJLFDO
XQLW\¶65 TKHGRPLQDQWYLHZVHHVWKHIXQFWLRQRIFRQVFLHQFHDVEHLQJµWRNHHSXVLQDFHUWDLQ
relation to ourselves, one in which we have proper regard for, and actively promote, our 
PRUDO LQWHJULW\¶66 and it fulfils this function by providing internal warnings and reminders 
DERXW WKH µLPSDFW RQ WKH VHOI RI YLRODWLQJ RXU GHHS PRUDO FRPPLWPHQWV¶ - shame, guilt, 
feelings of self-betrayal, and the like.67 According to McLeod, on the dominant view 
conscience has a personal but not a social value because it functions to keep us µin ³the 
proper relation´ to ourselves but not [necessarily] to others¶.68 McLeod regards the dominant 
view DVµGHILFLHQW¶SDUWO\EHFDXVHLWVIRFXVRQSUHVHUYLQJLQWHUQDOXQLW\causes it to overlook 
at least two kinds of important problematic cases. First, there are cases where individuals 
internalise oppressive (for example, sexist or racist) values as a result of exposure and 
normalisation, so that any internal unity they achieve is grounded in immoral premises. Such 
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individuals may be internally unified EXWVWLOOKDYHDµEDGFKDUDFWHU¶.69 Second, there are cases 
where acting in accordance with conscience leads not to internal unity and harmony but to 
µEURNHQQHVV¶DQGGHVSDLUEHFDXVHRIQHJative societal reaction to that conscientious action.70 
McLeod offers the example of a woman who speaks out against sexual harassment in the 
workplace only to find herself shunned, unemployed and dejected because an unsupportive 
society determines the meaning of her action to be troublemaking rather than courage.71  
 McLeod SURSRVHV DQ µDOWHUQDWH YLHZ¶ RI FRQVFLHQFH ZKLFK VKH GHVFULEHV DV D
µIHPLQLVWUHODWLRQDOSHUVSHFWLYH¶72 It is relational because it acknowledges the importance of 
social relationships in shDSLQJ LQGLYLGXDOV¶PRUDODJHQF\ and feminist because it highlights 
the fact that these relationships can be characterised by oppression and privilege, so that 
agency develops distortedly. The alternate view can be distinguished from the dominant view 
in at least three important ways. First, in the alternate view, the primary function of 
FRQVFLHQFH LV µQRW WR SUHVHUYH LQQHU XQLW\ EXW UDWKHU WR HQFRXUDJH SHRSOH VLPSO\ WR DFW Ln 
accordance with their moral values¶.73 0F/HRG¶VLVVWLOODQLQWHJrity based view of conscience 
because µD FRQVFLHQFH RI WKLV VRUW SURPRWHV RXU PRUDO LQWHJULW\ DOWKRXJK LQWHJULW\ KHUH LV
XQGHUVWRRG QRW DV LQQHU XQLW\ EXW UDWKHU DV DELGLQJ E\ RQH¶V EHVW judgment (in this case, 
moral judgment)¶.74 On this analysis moral integrity requires µ>W@DNLQJUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRURXU
PRUDOVHOYHV¶DQGnot internal unification per se.75  The second important difference between 
the dominant and alternate views is that whereas the former is an individualistic view in 
which conscience has only personal value, the latter emphasises the relational nature of 
conscience and its social value: 
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Moral integrity - adhering to our best moral judgment - requires social support, but it 
is also good for society. Its value is social rather than merely personal « there is 
social value in people taking their own best moral judgment seriously. Society needs 
this commitment from people so that genuine debates about moral right and wrong 
occur, which have value because they help to improve our moral understanding « 
and integrity has social value - it involves being in tKH µSURSHU UHODWLRQ¶ WRRWKHUV - 
because it contributes to this process.76 
 
Thus, unlike the dominant view which (according to McLeod) sees conscience only in terms 
of preserving internal unity regardless of the values being internalised, on the alternate view 
µ>F@RQVFLHQFHLVYDOXDEOH « not only when it urges us to take our moral values seriously but 
also when it forces us to rethink those values, after perhaps clarifying for us what those 
values are¶.77 7KXVµ>Z@KLOHWKHDOWHUQDWHYLHZRIFRQVFLHQFHHPSKDVL]HVWKHLPSRUWDQFHRI
people reflecting on the judgments that inform their conscience, the dominant view says 
relatively little in this regard¶.78 Fitzgerald has developed this aspect of Mc/HRG¶VDOWHUQDWH
view and agrees with her WKDW WKH GRPLQDQW YLHZ µQHJOHFWV DQ LPSRUWDQW DVSHFW RI D ZHOO-
IXQFWLRQLQJ FRQVFLHQFH¶ QDPHO\ WKHQHHG WRKDYHDZDUHness of, and control over, implicit 
attitudes.79 Fitzgerald claims that an advantage of the alternate account is that it encourages 
DJHQWV WR EH µHPRWLRQDOO\ VHOI-DZDUH¶ WR HQJDJH LQ µUHIOHFWLYH VHOI-PRQLWRULQJ¶, and to be 
attentive to social feedback.80 The moral community has an important role as a corrective 
influence, therefore, but it also has an equally important role in providing a supportive 
environment in which judgements of conscience can be exercised and vindicated. In the 
health context, for example: 
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genuine protection for conscience « require[s] that the culture of health care 
institutions not be hostile toward individual conscience, especially the conscience of 
health care professionals who have minority views, who are members of marginalized 
social groups, or who are powerless relative to doctors or administrators.81 
 
McLeod and Fitzgerald shDUH*LXELOLQL¶VFRQFHUQWKDW conscience debates in health care have 
focused, so far, on form at the expense of content (0F/HRG¶V µEDG FKDUDFWHUV¶ DQG
)LW]JHUDOG¶V µLPSOLFLW ELDVHV¶,82 and they suggest that mainstream accounts of conscience 
appear WR OLRQL]H µLQWHJULW\¶, in the sense of inner unity or wholeness of the self, with no 
substantive questions asked. As we have noted in relation to Giubilini¶V argument, however, 
legitimate concerns about content and subjectivity have long been a feature of debates about 
conscience in health care. An µinternal values of medicine¶ DSSURDFK, which Giubilini 
acknowledges but (rightly) dismisses as a solution,83 is one way in which some have tried to 
limit the permissible content of CBEs. As an alternative, we have proposed using the legal 
FRQFHSWRIµSURSHUPHGLFDOWUHDWPHQW¶WRFRQILQHCBEs to cases where the status of a practice 
is genuinely liminal and seriously contested.84 Whether or not either of these approaches 
appeals, they demonstrate that the current debate is cognisant of questions of content, so that 
any suggestion that it neglects such matters is incorrect.  Moreover, others whom McLeod 
PLJKW UHJDUG DV SDUW RI WKH µGRPLQDQW¶ WUDGLWLRQ KDYH UHFRPPHQGHG WKDW DQ µDUWLFXODWLRQ
UHTXLUHPHQW¶VKRXOGDWWDFKWRWKHH[HUFLVHRICBEs.85  We support such a requirement, with 
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WKH SURYLVR WKDW WKH DUWLFXODWLRQ SURFHVV VKRXOG QRW WDNH WKH IRUP RI D µWULEXQDO¶ RU µGUDIW-
ERDUG¶,86 because: 
 
[w]e regard conscience « as a matter of reflection, deliberation and judgement. As 
such, a good faith exercise of conscience ought to include a willingness to try to 
externalise these processes in order to alleviate any legitimate concerns about the 
subjective elements of conscience.87 
 
McLeod herself, with Lori Kantymir, has made an important contribution to this area of the 
debate.88 The fact that versions of this suggestion feature regularly in academic debates about 
conscience demonstrates a willingness to address fears about subjectivity and legitimate 
concerns regarding content. 
 :KDW LV PRVW VWULNLQJ DERXW 0F/HRG¶V FULWLTXH IRU SUHVHQW SXUSRVHV LV WKDW LW
explicitly acknowledges the connection between conscience and integrity.  For McLeod, as 
for the mainstream writers she critiques, conscience is a matter of integrity. Although 
McLeod claims to undHUVWDQG µLQWHJULW\¶ GLIIHUHQWO\, she does not reject the idea of a 
connection. Moreover, it is possible to dispute that mainstream authors really conceive of 
integrity in the way McLeod alleges that they do, as V\QRQ\PRXV ZLWK µLQQHU XQLW\¶89 
6XOPDV\¶Vobservation that few have defined what they mean by conscience could also apply 
to integrity.90 In any case, the agent-integrity view we defend here sees the sort of integrity 
which CBEs exist to protect not as reducibOHWRµLQQHUXQLW\¶EXWas the proper functioning of 
moral agency.  
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 Ultimately, McLeod offers an explicitly integrity-based (albeit alternate) account of 
conscience.  Her complaint that existing accounts of conscience pay too little attention to its 
social or relational aspects is important, but it is by no means clear why the idea of a 
fundamental connection between conscience and integrity is incompatible with, or is likely to 
inhibit the development of, accounts of conscience which place greater emphasis on seeking 
and heeding feedback from the moral community. The very notion of integrity (including 
agent-integrity) seems, to us, to presuppose engagement with a moral community. 
 In our view, both *LXELOLQL¶VDQG0F/HRG¶V critiques leave the view of conscience as 
a matter of integrity, µ>W@KH SUHYDLOLQJ YLHZ RI FRQVFLHQFH LQ ELRHWKLFV¶,91 undisturbed. 
*LXELOLQL¶VDFFRXQWQHYHUVHULRXVO\challenges the link between conscience and integrity, and 
the powerful case for a more relational approach can be accommodated within an integrity 
based account, as McLeod herself proposes. 
 
IV. REJECTING THE INCOMPATIBILITY THESIS 
 
Having argued that conscience is a matter of agent-integrity and rejected some recent 
FULWLFLVPVRI µLQWHJULW\¶ views in general, we now seek to defend the idea of protection for 
conscience in health care against the µincompatibility thesis¶the claim that CBEs are 
incompatible ZLWK +&3V¶ SURIHVVLRQDO REOLJDWLRQV Among those who can broadly be 
described as proponents of this thesis, differences exist regarding both the source of the 
perceived incompatibility and what ought to be done about it. Regarding the latter, while 
proponents DOODJUHH WKDW+&3V µPXVWFKRRVHFDUHHUV LQZKLFK WKHLU IXQGDPHQWDOYDOXHVGR
not interfere with the autonomy and well-EHLQJ RI SDWLHQWV¶92 this yields three possible 
alternative conclusions. The first is that that individuals whose consciences forbid them from 
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being involved in certain lawful practices should not be HCPs at all, since µ>i]f people are not 
prepared to offer legally permitted, efficient, and beneficial care to a patient because it 
FRQIOLFWVZLWKWKHLUYDOXHVWKH\VKRXOGQRWEHGRFWRUV¶.93 The second is that HCPs who would 
seek to exercise CBEs should avoid those specialities in which they might encounter the 
practices that they find offensive.94 The third possible conclusion is that HCPs may practise 
in any area of medicine provided that whenever they perceive a conflict between their 
professional obligations and their personal views, they give priority to the former.95 All of 
those who argue that CBEs ought to be disallowed, severely restricted or merely tolerated in 
the health care context can be regarded as proponents of the incompatibility thesis, since 
these views reflect the belief that personal ethical commitments are, in some sense, 
incompatible with professional roles. 
 Regarding the source of the incompatibility, some claim it arises because HCPs have 
a professional obligation to practice their profession in a value neutral way.96  Others claim 
that health care has its own internal values and that it is these, rather than private or personal 
values, which HCPs are obliged to apply when performing their professional roles.97  We 
now consider the difficulties with each of these claims.98 
 
$µ9DOXHQHXWUDOLW\¶ 
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Some commentators insist that HCPVRXJKWWRDVSLUHWRWKHµLGHDO¶RIYDOXH neutrality. Robert 
%DNHU IRU H[DPSOH HQGRUVHV D µFRQFHSWLRQ RI PHGLFDO SURIHVVLRQDOLVP DV PRUDOO\ QHXWUDO
equitable, and non-MXGJPHQWDO¶99 aQG&DQWRUFODLPVWKDWµSDWLHQWV « should be able to expect 
«SURIHVVLRQDOV WR EH Qeutral arbiters of medical care¶.100 On this view, the individual 
consciences of HCPs have no proper role in influencing their practiceµ3ULYDWH¶RUSHUVRQDO
moral views must be eschewed in favour of the neutral performance of professional 
obligations. Although Baker is willing to concede that, under certain conditions, 
µSURIHVVLRQDOV ZKR IDLO WR PDLQWDLQ PRUDO QHXWUDOLW\¶ PD\ EH µH[FXVHG¶ IURP FHUWDLQ GXWLHV
provided that they apologise to patients, he emphasises that where permission to be excused 
is granted this is a concession rather than WKH H[HUFLVH RI DQ\ µULJKW to conscience-based 
denials of healthcare¶101 On the neutrality model, conscientious unwillingness to engage in 
particular practices is to be understood as a moral failure - the failure to live up to the moral 
ideal of neutrality. As such, while it may be tolerated, it cannot be admired or protected. 
 This approach has been criticised by those who deny that neutrality is an ideal in 
health care at all, and by others who observe that the neutrality model is not itself neutral 
since it embodies its own ethical values. In the first category, Adrienne Asch notes that health 
FDUHLVµDILHOGWKDWRIWHQILQGVLWVHOILQWKHWKLFNRIHWKLFDOTXDQGDULHV¶,102 and Weinstock calls 
it D µPRUDO PLQHILHOG¶103 WKDW LV µULIH ZLWK PRUDO FRQWURYHUV\¶.104 These critics note that 
µ>K@HDOWKFDUHSURIHVVLRQDOV « RIWHQRSHUDWHDWWKHIURQWLHUEHWZHHQOLIHDQGGHDWK¶105 so will 
often find themselves µPDNLQJPRUDODQGQRWPHUHO\PHGLFDODVVHVVPHQWVRISDLQVXIIHULQJ
and the benefits and burdens of continued life¶.106 But it is not only in life and death cases 
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that health care is an inescapably moral enterprise, since µWKH ZRUN RI GRctors and nurses 
involves them in daily interaction with patients and with other health care professionals in 
which moral judgment and agency is required¶.107 In day-to-day practice, then, the role of the 
HCP µGHPDQGV HWKLFDO LQWHJULW\ DQG QRW PHUHO\ WHFKQLFDO SURILFLHQF\¶.108 As such µ>W@KH
LQHVFDSDEOHIDFWLVWKDWYDOXHFKRLFHVHQWHULQWRPRVWFOLQLFDOGHFLVLRQV¶VRWKDWµ>W@KHUHLVQR
way to make clinical decisions value-free¶.109 
 The second type of criticism is that value neutrality µLV VLPSO\ D ODEHO IRU WKH
preferential imposition of one set of valuesthose of secular bioethicsas the only 
DFFHSWDEOH ³YDOXHV´ LQ DSOXUDOLVWLF VRFLHW\¶.110 Requiring HCPV WREH µQHXWUDO¶ DPRXQWV LQ
practice, to requiring them to be willing to participate in abortion, dispense emergency 
contraception and, in effect, go along with whatever is legal without raising any ethical 
objection.  Far from requiring true neutrality, then, value neutrality really amounts to 
insisting that HCPs take one particular side across a range of ethical dilemmas. Willingness 
to participate in these contested practices either demonstrates agreement with one ethical 
standpoint rather than another DV3HOOHJULQRSXWVLWµWKHSUR-choice stance is as value-laden 
as the pro-OLIHVWDQFH¶111), or reflects the HCP¶VEHOLHIWKDW her own moral view on the matter 
ought to be subordinated to the demands of her professional role. Either way, participation 
embodies a moral choice, not neutrality. Insisting upon value neutrality involves insisting 
either that individual HCPs must sign up with sincerity to the view of the majority within 
their profession or that they must behave as if they do, leaving their personal values at the 
door when they come to work.  
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%$QµLQWHUQDOPRUDOLW\RIPHGLFLQH¶"112 
 
According to other commentators, health care has its own µinternal PRUDOLW\¶ and appeals to 
conscience deserve to be accommodated only LIWKH\DUHEDVHGRQYDOXHVWKDWµFRUUHVSRQGWR
RQHRUPRUHFRUHYDOXHVLQPHGLFLQH¶113 John Arras identifies four approaches WRWKHµLQWHUQDO
morality of mediFLQH¶ (IMM):114 (i) µHVVHQWLDOLVP¶ZKLFKFODLPVWKDWWKHUHLVDXQLYHUVDODQG
uQFKDQJLQJ µHVVHQFH¶RIPHGLFLQH (ii) WKH µHYROXWLRQDU\ SHUVSHFWLYH¶ZKLFKDFNQRZOHGJHs 
that internal standards exist but claims that they are influenced by, and evolve with, external 
values; (iii) µKLVWRULFDOSURIHVVLRQDOLVP¶ZKLFKSULYLOHJHVWKHYDOXHVHVWDEOLVKHGDQGHQGRUVHG
by those within the relevant profession(s); and (iv) WKH µSUDFWLFDO SUHFRQGLWLRQ¶ DSSURDFK, 
which tries to identify the conditions that must exist if the practice of medicine is to be 
possible at all.115 
 The latter two can be dealt with briefly. First, the practical precondition approach tries 
to describe for medicine, as Fuller did for law,116 the norms which are prerequisites for the 
efficacious functioning of the practice.117 Arras gives the example of a duty of confidentiality 
in medicine.118 If confidentiality were not observed, patients would not trust HCPs or disclose 
the information necessary for effective diagnosis and treatment. The norms identified by this 
approach UHQGHU D µYHU\ WKLQ DFFRXQW RI WKH JRDOV RI PHGLFLQH¶ according to Arras, which 
tells us only ZKDWPXVWKROGLQRUGHUIRUWKHSUDFWLFDODFWLYLW\RIPHGLFLQHWREHDEOHWRµJHW
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RII WKH JURXQG¶119  Second, historical professionalism is not an authentically internalist 
approach at all.120 Unlike the other approaches to internalism, it does not endeavour to 
identify values that are essential or intrinsic to the practice of medicine (even in the thin, 
IRUPDOVHQVHRI WKHµSUDFWLFDOSUHFRQGLWLRQ¶DSSUoach). Rather, the only sense in which it is 
internal is the quite different sense of being concerned with values defined from within - 
articulated by the profession, for the profession. Robert 9HDWFKGHVFULEHVWKLVDVDµFRUUXSWHG
XVDJH¶RIWKHWHUPµLQWHUQDOPRUDOLW\¶VLQFHLWGRHVQRWGHscribe an attempt to articulate any 
value which is intrinsic to the practice of medicine itself.121 Nevertheless, he notes that the 
corruption has been widely adopted, and indeed, defenders of the incompatibility thesis do 
VRPHWLPHV DVVHUW VLPSO\ WKDW +&3V RXJKW WR DGKHUH WR µSURIHVVLRQDO YDOXHV¶ UDWKHU WKDQ
personal ones, without specifying what they mean by µprofessional values¶. This has serious 
implications for agent-integrity, as we discuss in Section IV. D. 
 Essentialist and evolutionary approaches have generated the most academic 
discussion. Essentialist approaches DUH LQVSLUHG E\ WKH FRQFHSW RI D µSUDFWLFH¶, defined by 
Alasdair MacIntyre as:  
 
any coherent and complex form of socially established co-operative human activity 
through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of 
trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially 
definitive of, that form of activity.122  
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Essentialists advocate understanding medicine/ health care as a practice and claim that it has 
an essential, unchanging nature which involves the pursuit of certain ends.123 These ends are 
claimed to be intrinsic to the practice in the sense of being derived from the nature of 
medicine itself and definitive of its nature.124  +DYLQJ LGHQWLILHG WKH LQWULQVLF µHQGV RI 
PHGLFLQH¶ essentialists claim that we can answer ethical questions about the practice of 
medicine by reflecting on the values that promote the achievement of these proper ends, 
without reference to external values.125 Perhaps the best-known essentialist account of the 
IMM is that advanced by Edmund Pellegrino.126 He identified the moral heart of the practice 
of medicine as being the face-to-face clinical encounter between someone in need (the 
patient) and someone who professes to be able and willing to help (the HCP).127 Wherever 
and whenever medicine is practised, the clinical encounter forms its moral core.128 Thus, the 
XQLYHUVDOHQGVRIPHGLFLQHDUHµKHOSLQJDQGKHDOLQJ¶.129 Pellegrino uses µKHDOLQJ¶QRW LQ WKH
QDUURZ VHQVH RI µUHVWRULQJ WR IXOO KHDOWK¶, but in a wider sense which includes comforting, 
caring, and being present, as in palliative care, for example.130 For him, the essence of 
medicine is an encounter aimed at helping and healing in this broad sense, and the IMM 
consists of the values that align with this essence by advancing those ends.  
 Evolutionary approaches agree that there are values internal to the practice of 
medicine. For example, Franklin Miller and Howard Brody,131 whose evolutionary 
perspective iV UHJDUGHG E\ $UUDV DV WKH µPRVW SODXVLEOH DQG DWWUDFWLYH PRGHO RI PHGLFDO
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LQWHUQDOLVP DGYDQFHG VR IDU¶,132 WDNH WKH IUDPHZRUN RI WKH ,00 WR LQFOXGH WKH µJRDOV¶ RI
medicine,133 the proper duties of a physician, DQG µFOLQLFDO YLUWXHV¶134 In contrast to 
essentialist approaches, evolutionary approaches regard these internal values DVµHYROYLQJ¶LQ
response to external developments, so that new goals might be identified, or existing ones 
UHLQWHUSUHWHGµDVD UHVXOWRIDGLDOHFWLFRUFRQYHUVDtion  between the medical profession and 
ODUJHU VRFLHW\¶135 7KXV µWKH PRUDOLW\ RI PHGLFLQH LV DOZD\V IRUJHG LQ D GLDOHFWLFDO
relationship with the surrounding (external) worlds of common morality, law, commerce, 
technology, and so on¶.136 Miller and Brody emphasise that, for MacIntyre, practices are 
social phenomena, embedded in communities, and that we cannot fully conceptualise them, 
RUIXOO\VSHFLI\WKHLUµHQGV¶ZLWKRXWUHIHUHQFHWRWKHLUVRFLDOVFDIIROGLQJ137 
 In the 1990s, the Hastings Center convened a panel of experts from 14 countries to 
UHDVVHVV WKH JRDOV RI PHGLFLQH µLQ OLJKW RI >PHGLFLQH¶V@ FRQWHPSRUDU\ SRVVLELOLWLHV DQG
SUREOHPV¶138 7KH SDQHO¶V DSSURDFK LV EHVW FKDUDFWHULVHG DV HYROXWLRQDU\ DOWKRXJK WKH\
DJUHHG WKDWPHGLFLQHµGRHVKDYHDQGKDVDOZays had, some universal core values and is in 
WKDW VHQVH PDUNHG E\ LQKHUHQW JRDOV¶139 they acknowledged WKDW µLWV NQRZOHGJH DQG VNLOOV
also lend themselves to a significant degree of social construction¶.140 The resulting report 
identified four goals which were VDLGWRUHSUHVHQWµWKHFRUHYDOXHVRIPHGLFLQH¶ 
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(i) The prevention of disease and injury and promotion and maintenance of health; 
(ii) The relief of pain and suffering caused by maladies; 
(iii) The care and cure of those with a malady, and the care of those who cannot be 
cured; 
(iv) The avoidance of premature death and the pursuit of a peaceful death.141 
 
The idea of an IMM can be criticised on a number of grounds. One important criticism is that 
truly internalist accounts are unable to provide specific guidance for HCPs about what to do 
when faced with a real life moral dilemma. Once we believe we have identified a valid 
end/goal, how do we check its validity? Some approaches allow for the identification of 
multiple, even conflicting ends/goals, yet provide no clear indication of how conflicts 
between them are to be resolved.142 Moreover, the ends/goals themselves are invariably 
expressed in terms so vague that even where there is general agreement that something 
(µKHDOLQJ¶say) is a core value of medicine, it is sufficiently ambiguous to be compatible with 
competing (indeed, opposite) conclusions about what it requires in practice. For example, is 
euthanasia compatible or incompatible with goal (iv) above?143  
 Perhaps most damaging of all for internalism is that in deciding wKDW LV µJRRG¶ Rr 
µULJKW¶LQWKHKHDOWKcare context it is impossible to avoid reference to external values. First, 
the terms in which the SURSRVHGµends¶ are expressed (µKHDOWK¶µZHOOEHLQJ¶RUHYHQµGHDWK¶
cannot themselves be defined without appealing to external factors.144 Additionally, knowing 
what is good and right in the context of a particular patient requires knowledge of external 
factors, such as WKH SDWLHQW¶V SHUVRQDO ZLVKes, religious and other beliefs, and lifestyle.145 
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Moreover, when we want to claim that HCPs should not be involved in certain activities 
(such as euthanasia, judicial execution or torture), this is invariably because we disapprove of 
the activities for external moral reasons (such as respect for dignity, the sanctity of life or 
consideration of the social risk involved). Arguments in favour of doctors being involved in 
controversial practices also cite external factors (such as lawfulness, public good or freedom 
of choice).146 
 To these familiar criticisms we would add another: doubt about just how internal the 
VXSSRVHGO\ µLQWHUQDO YDOXHV¶ DUH 7DNH WKH HQGV LGHQWLfied by Pellegrino, for example: 
µKHOSLQJ¶ DQGµKHDOLQJ¶GHILQHGEURDGO\VRDVWRLQFOXGHcaring, comforting DQGVLPSO\µEHLQJ
WKHUH¶ Although Pellegrino sources them in the HCP-patient encounter, these are arguably 
general moral obligations insofar as it seems possible to regard them as arising in many (if 
not all) human encounters. Once we move beyond narrow technical skills, it becomes 
SRVVLEOH WR DUJXH WKDW WKH µVRIWHU¶ goods and skills associated with medicine are specific 
exercises of more general moral dutiesUDWKHUWKDQPRUDOGXWLHVµLQWHUQDO¶WRWKHSUDFWLFHRI
health care itself. We discuss this further under heading C below. For all of the reasons 
canvassed here, we regard µinternal morality¶ as no more successful than value neutrality as a 
basis for the incompatibility thesis.  
 
C. Personal commitments and professional obligations 
 
Regardless of whether the rationale for the incompatibility thesis is given as value neutrality 
or internal morality, the thesis always depends on the notion that HCPs can and should 
compartmentalise their public and private ethics, sealing their private values safely away 
from their professional practice.  Insofar as this idea presupposes a distinction between the 
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µSXEOLFSURIHVVLRQDO¶ DQG µSULYDWHSHUVRQDO¶ DVSHFWV RI LQGLYLGXDOV¶ OLYHV KRZHYHU LW LV
problematic.   
 
1. 7KHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQµSXEOLF¶DQGµSULYDWH¶PRUDOREOLJDWLRQVLVTXHVWLRQDEOH 
As we have just noted, it is possible to regard the ethical values and duties that attach to 
HCPs in their professional roles as being continuous with general ethical values and 
obligations. Professional duties of veracity, fidelity and confidentiality, for example, map 
fairly straightforwardly on to general ethical duties of truthfulness, good faith and 
confidence-keeping (albeit that with regard to the latter, whereas a duty of confidentiality is 
automatically implied into the HCP-patient relationship, an expectation of confidentiality 
may need to be made explicit in some (but not all) other cases before an ethical duty can be 
said to exist). Likewise, duties of beneficence and non-maleficence are widely recognised 
outside of the healthcare context. The Golden Rule, for example, entails duties to help and 
QRWKDUPRWKHUV WKH UXOH µKDVEHHQH[SUHVVHG LQ VRPH IRUP LQPRVWRU DOO RI WKHZRUOG¶V
UHOLJLRQV¶147 and is also embraced by secular moral systems including humanism.148 As one of 
us has noted in another context: 
 
All [mainstream ethical theories] seem to proceed upon some version of the idea that 
moral agents are required, ethically, to respond to the vulnerability of their fellow 
human beings ... by positively protecting/assisting them, and/or by refraining from 
exploiting them or otherwise causing them harm.149 
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$W ILUVW JODQFH LW PD\ EH WHPSWLQJ WR WKLQN WKDW VD\ D GRFWRU¶V HWKLFDO GXW\ WR NHHS KHU
knowledge and skills up to date is specific to her role as a doctor and has nothing to do with 
her private commitments, and that, vice versa, her duty to be faithful to her domestic partner 
is a purely private obligation. On closer inspection, however, the former duty can be seen as a 
particular instance of the wider duties of non-maleficence and beneficence (which, we have 
argued, are not exclusive to the healthcare setting) and the latter duty can be seen as an 
instance of the wider moral duties to be truthful and act in good faith (which translate as 
veracity and fidelity in the clinical encounter).  
 General moral obligations do take on more specific forms depending on the 
circumstances and the role being performed, so that the precise content of my duty to be 
truthful is different when with a patient than with friends or a partner. $ +&3¶V PRUDO
obligations may also be heightened by certain features of the clinical encounter, such as the 
SDWLHQW¶VLQFUHDVHGYXOQHUDELOLW\WKH+&3¶VHQKDQFHGDELOLW\WRKHOSDQ\ oaths the HCP has 
taken, DQGWKH+&3¶VLPSOLHGFRPPLWPHQWWRKHUSURIHVVLRQ¶VFRGHVRIHWKLFV But the same 
moral obligations may be just as heightened in other contexts by other factors (for example, 
in the context of the parent-child relationship).   
 In our view, the health care encounter can be regarded as involving an intensification 
of general moral obligations, rather than as giving rise to obligations that are specifically 
µSURIHVVLRQDO¶. As such, we doubt whether WKHFRQWRXUVRIDSURIHVVLRQDO¶VSXEOLFDQGSULYDWH
obligations can be mapped with sufficient clarity to make confident assertions about 
appropriate compartmentalisation. 
 
2. &ULWLFLVPRIµSublic/private divides¶ 
One major project of feminist legal theory has been to problematise notions of the 
µSXEOLFSULYDWHGLYLGH¶ QRWOHDVWWKHLGHDWKDWµKRPH¶LVDµSULYDWHVSKHUH¶DQGµZRUN¶EHORQJV
36 
 
WR WKH µSXEOLF VSKHUH¶ The important role of WKH µSXEOLFSULYDWH¶ divide in entrenching 
ZRPHQ¶V VXEMXJDWLRQ has been exposed and the validity of the divide challenged, as 
HQFDSVXODWHG LQ WKH IDPRXV VORJDQ LQVLVWLQJ WKDW µWKH SHUVRQDO LV SROLWLFDO¶150 Thus, an 
important legacy of twentieth century legal feminism is that any assertion of a public/private 
divide can no longer be accepted uncritically. Instead, we ought to regard such claims with 
suspicion and interrogate what their acceptance would mean for the power relations involved.  
As Frances Olsen has askedµ[w]hat does the person who wields SRZHUJDLQ¶E\PDNLQJWKH
distinction?151 Of concern to feminist scholars was the tendency to designate home and 
family DV µSULYDWH¶ LQ RUGHU to exclude state power from these areas, leaving men free to 
RSSUHVVZRPHQµLQSULYDWH¶ZLWKRXWWKHWKUHDWRIVWDWHLQWHUYHQWLRQ Traditionally, therefore, it 
has EHHQ DVVHUWLRQV RI µSULYDWH-nesV¶ WKDW KDYH been regarded as troubling. But once the 
public/private divide has been destabilised, we can also object to problematic assertions of 
µSXEOLF-QHVV¶such as the claim that HCPs should leave their personal ethical commitments in 
WKHµSULYDWHUHDOP¶DQGDSSO\GLIIHUHQWHYHQcontradictoryVWDQGDUGVLQWKHLUµSXEOLFUROHV¶.  
 
3. Compartmentalisation is the antithesis of integrity 
To insist that HCPs operate only as HCPs and give weight only to the responsibilities and 
values that are supposedly associated with their professional roles, while ignoring or 
suppressing any values they have absorEHG IURP RWKHU VRXUFHV VXFK DV µOLIH H[SHULHQFHV
UHOLJLRXV EHOLHIV DQG IDPLO\ YDOXHV¶,152 is to deny integrity in the clearest possible way. 
Moreover, research suggests that it risks serious negative consequences, not only for HCPs 
themselves, but also for their patients. The risk for HCPs LV WKDW µ>F@RPSDUWPHQWDOL]DWLRQ
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OHDGVWRWKHPRUDOIUDJPHQWDWLRQRIWKHSHUVRQ¶153 since µ>D@FWLQJDJDLQVW\RXUFRQYLFWLRQLQ
choice situations of great importance will injure your moral identity, sometimes with 
psychological and emotional repercussions¶.154  These repercussions might include feelings 
RIµVHOI-EHWUD\DO¶RUµORVVRIVHOI-UHVSHFW¶155 µEXUQRXW IDWLJXHDQGHPRWLRQDOH[KDXVWLRQ¶156 
µDQJHU DQ[LHW\ JXLOW VRUURZ IUXVWUDWLRQ DQGRU KHOSOHVVQHVV¶157  µRXWUDJH¶158 RU µPRUDO
GLVWUHVV¶ZKLFKUHVXOWVIURPµDSHUFHLYHGYLRODWLRQRIRQH¶VFRUHYDOXHVDQGGXWLHV¶.159  In an 
HIIRUW WR DYRLG WKHVH RXWFRPHV VRPH +&3V PD\ µGHDGHQ¶160 their consciences in order to 
continue in their professional roles, risking even higher levels of burnout.161 Weinstock 
suggests that the risk for patients is that WKH\µwill not be well-served by moral automatons 
who shape their practices, without struggle or reflection, to the desires of patients and the 
dictates of whatever regime is currently in power¶.162   
 These are, ultimately, empirical claims, and our argument here does not depend on 
their truth. Regardless of any measurable harm to HCPs or patients, compartmentalisation is 
the antithesis of integrity. An ability to cast off RU VXVSHQG RQH¶V SHUVRQDO Hthical 
commitments is ethically suspect and should raise serious doubts about integrity and 
commitment. $V&KDUOHV+HSOHUKDV UHPDUNHG µ>Z@HZRXOGEHQDwYH WRH[SHFW >D+&3@ WR
forsake his or her ethics in one area (e.g., abortion) while applying them for the patienW¶V
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welfare in every other area¶.163 If health care is, as we believe, an inescapably moral 
enterprise in which integrity and commitment are essential, it is HCPs who lack these 
qualities who ought to be regarded as unfit to perform their roles and not those who allow 
personal commitments to inform their professional practice.  
 
4.Insistence on compartmentalisation amounts to a denial of moral agency 
In Section II, we discussed and endorsed the view of conscience as a matter of integrity and 
as associated with one (or more) aspect(s) of moral agency (we used µagent-integrity¶ as 
shorthand for all of this). In Section III we demonstrated that this view has not been 
successfully undermined. If the agent-integrity view is accepted, the demand that individual 
HCPs suspend their private consciences while at work equates to a demand that, while 
practising, HCPs suspend elements of their moral agency and cease, to some extent, to be 
moral selves. Suppressing personal convictions in the performaQFHRIDUROHPHDQVWKDWµWKH
value of being a moral agent is lost and replaced by the instrumental value of being a good 
role-performer¶.164 This is an alarming prospect. Once the capacity for moral agency has 
developed, there is arguably not only a right but a duty to exercise it - to care about questions 
of right and wrong, to be committed to right action, to deliberate, DQGWRµGRULJKW¶. Insofar as 
this can be expressed in terms of a moral right to be allowed to function as a moral agent, it 
seems reasonable to regard such a right as being at least as important as any of the moral 
rights that might be taken to weigh against enshrining protection for conscience in law; for 
example, the rights of patients to specific health interventions (except perhaps life-saving 
interventions), or the rights of institutions (such as NHS trusts or governing bodies of the 
health professions) to jurisdiction over their members/employees. When individuals are 
prevented from closing the agency loop by acting on their consciences, this can be regarded 
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as fundamentally undermining the whole enterprise of moral agency165 and as 
quintessentially morally harmful.  As Hardt concludes: 
 
>W@KHSUHVXPSWLRQWKDWFRQVFLHQFHLVEHVWNHSWLQWKHUHDOPRIRQH¶VSULYDWHFRQGXFWLV
ultimately morally untenable.  A coherent understanding of moral agency requires a 
XQL¿HGPRUDODJHQWZKRFDUULHVZLWKKHUVRPHIXQGDPHQWDOPRUDOFRPPLWPHQWVWKDW
inform the conscience across role-VSHFL¿FERXQGDULHV166 
 
 
D. Professional ethics as µdominant discourse¶ 
  
In section IV.B, we noted WKDWUHIHUHQFHVWRµSURIHVVLRQDO¶YDOXHVPD\VRPHWLPHVGHQRWH not 
the timeless µends¶ of medicine as a practice, but the contingent values of the health 
professions, agreed by their members and reflected in, for example, guidance documents or 
codes of ethics. This approach is exemplified in Avery KolHUV¶ VWDWHPHQW WKDW µ[t]o be a 
SURIHVVLRQDO LVDPRQJRWKHU WKLQJV WRHQGRUVHDVRQH¶V RZQWKHHQGVRI WKHSURIHVVLRQ¶.167 
Kolers is aware of the implications of this for moral agency, and seems to regard them as 
unproblematic, observing that: 
 
on a professional model no one is the sole proprietor of her own moral agency. 
,GHQWLILFDWLRQ ZLWK SURIHVVLRQDO QRUPV PHDQV WKDW ERWK RQH¶V PRUDO FRPPLWPHQWV
WKHPVHOYHV DQG RQH¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKRVH FRPPLWPHQWV DUH Vhaped by the 
institution.168 
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However, any claim that individual HCPs should be willing to cede moral authority to 
µSURIHVVLRQDO HWKLFV¶ ZKLOH DW ZRUN should prompt us to question how these professional 
norms are created and the legitimacy that is claimed for them. Critical Discourse Analysis has 
taught us, when confronted with a powerful discourse or narrative, to ask questions such as: 
who has access and who lacks access to the discursive process by which norms of 
professional ethics are created; who controls and who lacks control over the framework 
within which the discourse takes place (in terms of timing, location, participation, agenda, 
format and parameters); and what mechanisms, if any, exist for 
resisting/challenging/subverting its normative conclusions? The purpose of asking these 
questions is to understand the patterns of power that are present in a given discourse (which 
includes talk/text itself and all the background conditions, rules and categories against which 
the talk or text occurs),169 and to question the legitimacy of the narrative(s) that emerge(s) 
from the production process.  
 It is appropriate to pose these questions whenever we encounter a powerful discourse, 
especially one that claims normative authority over the behaviour of particular individuals or 
groups. In the healthcare context, it is pertinent to ask ZKHWKHU µSURIHVVLRQDOHWKLFV¶FDQEH
regarded a dominant discourse - a way of conceptualising and discussing ethical issues in 
health care which reflects the values and assumptions of the most powerful members of the 
professions.   Until now, the ethical guidance issued by professional bodies has scarcely been 
scrutinised in these terms.170  
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Until there has been such scrutiny, we have reason to question demands that individual HCPs 
(and particularly relatively powerless members of the professions) be willing to abide by the 
normative conclusions rendered by such discourses, even in defiance of their own 
consciences. On the agent-integrity view of conscience we propose in Part I, the jurisdiction 
of individual conscience can be justified quite straightforwardly on the basis that the exercise 
of conscience is essential to the development and maintenance of moral agency. As Albert 
Bandura has noted µ>D@ FRPSOHWH WKHRU\ RI PRUDO DJHQF\ PXVW link moral knowledge and 
reasoning to moral conduct¶.171 By contrast, neither the justification for the jurisdictional 
FODLP RI µSURIHVVLRQDO HWKLFV¶ nor the case for it being sufficiently strong to displace the 
jurisdiction of individual conscience has been made out.  
 If our concerns about professional ethics as dominant discourse are well-founded - 
and we hope to investigate this in future work - CBEs are likely to be one of the main 
mechanisms by which the master narrative and its normative assumptions are challenged and 
resisted.172 Whether we express this in terms of µdominant discourse¶ or not, disallowing 
CBEs will inevitably silence or drive out dissenting voices, and we can reasonably expect this 
to cause professional values to become more static and conservative. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
Here, we have sought to defend the place of CBEs in healthcare in two ways. First, we have 
argued that conscience is fundamentally and ineluctably connected to integrity and the 
possibility of moral agency, and that this connection can be defended against its critics. 
Second, we have sought to demonstrate that the main argument against protection for 
conscience, the incompatibility thesis, is fatally flawed. We have challenged the 
incompatibility thesis by rejecting each of the alternative claims that might underpin it, 
namely that the practice of health care ought to be value-neutral or that it ought to be 
informed only by values which are internal to the institution of health care itself. We have 
argued that value-neutrality is impossible for HCPs because value choices are unavoidable in 
the health care setting, and that it is also disingenuous, since insistence upon value-neutrality 
is really a demand that HCPs participate in a range of contested practices which are 
themselves far from value-neutral. In relation to µLQWHUQDO¶ values (the IMM) we have argued 
that these cannot be formulated in any way that provides concrete answers to morally 
controversial practices. Even if they could, it would still be problematic to insist that they be 
JLYHQ SUHFHGHQFH RYHU PRUDO DJHQWV¶ RZQ FRQVFLHQWLRXV FRQFOXVLRQV IRU VHYHUDO related 
reasons. 
 First, because the idea of a FOHDU GLYLVLRQ EHWZHHQ µSXEOLF¶ DQG µSULYDWH¶ PRUDO
commitments is itself problematic; second, because assertions of public/private divides may 
serve partisan purposes, and ought not to be accepted uncritically; and, finally, because the 
kind of self-fragmentation envisaged here is the very antithesis of integrity/commitment and 
an offence to moral agency LW µPDNH>V@ D PRFkery of the whole concept of moral 
LQWHJULW\¶173). There is also, in our view, a need to subject discourses of professional ethics to 
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critical analysis, enquiring about access to the process of discourse production and the 
availability of opportunities for resisting dominant narratives.  
 Elsewhere, we have identified three important types of natural limit on the scope and 
exercise of CBEs which, if observed, would prevent any erratic or excessive expansion of 
CBEs.174  Within these parameters, CBEs are essential to the maintenance of HCPs¶ agent-
integrity and, as such, they require robust protection. 
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